June 25, 1876 was a date that triggered intense investigation, debate, and writing regarding Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer and the "Battle of the Little Bighorn." Recent field investigation has defined types of armaments, strategic positions, and a host of minutia regarding the Seventh Cavalry and participating Indians. No doubt the Indians greatly outnumbered the Cavalry, but also had some advantages in weaponry. The question has long been asked, "How and why did the U.S. Army send Custer into the field with questionable arms and soldiers virtually untrained in the use of those arms?"

The Seventh Cavalry's primary weapons were the .45 Colt single action revolver and the Springfield Model 1873 "Trapdoor" .45-55 carbine, a single shot using metal cartridges with 55 grains of black powder for less recoil versus the .45-70 rifle version with the same case and 70 grains of black powder.

Typical of government, a Board of Officers in the Ordinance Department selected these arms after examining and testing several dozen possibilities. It seems the Board selected the "Trapdoor" rifle for many of the wrong reasons, including some highly suspect. Even the Indians, at the time, had some modern fast loading and shooting .44 Winchester or Henry rifles with 13 cartridge magazine capacity. The Seventh had to try to load and shoot a single shot rifle that occasionally had the copper-cased cartridges jam.

Obviously none of these early weapons were accurate much over 150 yards, even in the hands of a skilled shooter. Bullet velocity of black powder guns was low, less than half that of a modern .223.

Shooting accuracy depends on practice, practice, practice. The opposite was true of the Seventh who were assigned only 20 cartridges per year per man for practice. The Selection Board, on the surface, was highly interested in economy and low cost. They did not seem to understand the soldier's need for protection, mainly firepower.

Many original accounts written about the Battle of the Little Bighorn failed to consider the Indian's perspective, especially as related to Custer's ability to defend. Most books and articles deal with military maneuvers, locations, numbers, etc., but say little about each side's arms other than in passing.

I come from a frontier family, who came to Montana in 1865, who had use and familiarity with weapons. It always struck me as odd the way the Army looked at some of the frontier Cavalry weapons­ almost like they were still fighting with clubs and spears. Their rifles had to be "rugged" to be selected for use. However, function always seemed to me to be the criteria for a good rifle.

Out of curiosity, I bought one of the Cavalry's improved Springfield Trapdoor Carbines "Serial Number412761" model 1882 originally issued in 1873. This was a beat-up affair with a broken stock screwed together, but otherwise functional. It had been surplussed to Warner Brothers and used in early cowboy movies. Apparently these guns received rough treatment during filming.

Just as the Army Weapon Selection Committee did prior to 1873, I examined and limited tested this rifle trying to see just what was special. The stock was broken due to weak wood cross-grain design coupled with inletting for the trigger assembly. This gun would not function long as a club and could not be classified as rugged.

Rate-of-fire reported by the Army was about 12 rounds per minute subject to shooter skill. Our tests found 4 to 6 rounds per minute to realistically be more accurate. This clumsy rifle had numerous steps to follow when firing, requiring both hands in odd positions as follows:

1.) Recover from previous recoil

2.) Cock hammer

3.) Switch Trapdoor Lock

4.) Lift Trapdoor and eject shell casing

5.) Reach for shell in belt

6.) Load shell

7.) Close Trapdoor 8.) Aim and fire

During battle conditions in the dirt and brush, coupled with odd positions without good access to shells, time would take much longer to operate the Trapdoor. How did the Army possibly think they could fire 12 rounds per minute when less than 4 is realistic?

Use of copper shell casings by Custer's troops resulted in jams of unknown number since casings needed to be pried out, rammed out, or the rifle discarded with the shell inside. In any case, this problem added to battle confusion. One telling interview with Chief Gall and Pretty White Buffalo as reported by author Leila Monaghan stated:

"Did the soldiers have plenty of ammunition?"

"No, they shot away all they had. The horses ran away carrying in the saddle bag pockets a heap more. The soldiers threw their guns aside and fought with little guns."

Note: Guns being .45-55 Springfield Carbines and little guns being .45 Colt Revolvers.

This probably means carbines were too slow or jammed while pistols were faster. As some reports indicated, some soldiers had not used all their shells. Rifle shells were heavy and most were carried in saddle bags.

A competitor during rifle selection by the Army prior to 1873 was the Henry, developed in 1860.

This 13-shot magazine .44 caliber lever action repeater was considered too fragile by the Army. However, owning a Henry during the Civil War was a point of pride and many Federal troops purchased one. Although not used on a large scale during the Civil War, the Henry rifle demonstrated its advantage of rapid fire at close range several times. The Army generally rejected the Henry, the Plains Indians did not. One historian said, "One cavalry man armed with a Henry rifle was equivalent to 14 with a single shot rifle." A Confederate Colonel called it:

"That damned Yankee rifle that can be loaded on Sunday and fired all week."

Lt. Col. Custer was famous for seeming bravery by having his Cavalry rush headlong into battle. He was successful and made famous at Gettysburg and in Indian wars such as at Washita, although here against a peaceful village. In the West he was, however, saddled with the new 1873 Springfield Carbine, copper cased shells and relatively untrained troops. At the Little Big Hom he tried his typical tactic, but this time, against a large prepared Indian force, many aimed with Henry or Winchester rifles. The battle did not last long. Custer, with no fire power and undermanned, made a huge underestimated mistake.

With his aggressive personality and poor weaponry, he had no chance. Effectively the Army killed Custer by putting him out front with poor weapons. About one-half million Trapdoor-type rifles, carbines and miscellaneous were the subject of a supply contract issued by the Army. My research shows the Trapdoor did not meet criteria advertised by being slow in firepower and not very rugged. Although several dozen weapons, many superior to the Trapdoor, were considered, somehow the Army selected a vastly inferior gun!

Custer obviously did not understand what was done to him, and he was not the only officer to suffer from lack of adequate arms. The Nez Perce Indians located generally in Oregon and Idaho were those that helped Lewis and Clark on their journey and were supportive of early white settlers. However, as whites took over, greed forced the Nez Perce to move and begin an exodus through Montana in 1877. They tried to do this peacefully, as evidenced by contact with my great grandfather H.A. Nottingham, a freighter operating between Fort Benton and the gold fields. The Helena Independent, Helena, Montana, the 3rd of August 1877 reported:

"Mr. Nottingham, a freighter just arrived in town from Gallatin, reports meeting two Nez Perces scouts at the mouth of Boulder Creek

four days ago, with whom he had a talk. They said they were Nez Perces, that they came by the way of the Big Hole, and that their people to the

number of250 (warriors) were coming over by the same route; that they were going to hunt buffalo, and did not intend to molest settlers. They said their people were well armed, and also informed Mr. N. that they were "abused

on the other side of the mountains."

The U.S. Army would have none of a peaceful move and began harassing the Indians at every opportunity. At the "Battle of the Big Hole", Colonel Gibbon tried an August 7, 1877 dawn attack with foot soldiers armed with Springfield Trapdoor rifles. Firing into tepees, similar to Custer's Major Reno at the Little Big Horn, the attack started successfully, but soon turned as warriors regrouped using Winchester Repeating rifles. Gibbon was left routed in a defensive position, suffering heavy casualties, until the Nez Perce moved away. (Examples of each side's arms can be seen at the Battleground Information Center.) Loss of life resulted because Gibbon was saddled with primitive arms.

Later my great grandfather, while freighting, again encountered the Nez Perce at Cow Island, downriver from Fort Benton, on September 28, 1877. The River Press published that his freight wagons were attacked but he escaped. Really!! He knew these people from a previous meeting in late July 1877, and all they wanted was to trade.